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Rice: Evolving Evidentiary Needs: A Neglected Responsibility

EVOLVING EVIDENTIARY NEEDS:
A NEGLECTED RESPONSIBILITY
Paul R. Rice*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In his article entitled The Casefor Selective Abolition of the Rules
of Evidence, Professor David Crump presents a number of thoughtprovoking ideas about evidentiary rules that may have outlived their
usefulness, at least in the manner in which they currently are employed.
While I support many of his proposals in theory, his proposed focus on
cost effectiveness has a tendency to overshadow the many shades of
fairness that our rules were designed to protect. In my decades of
teaching evidence, I have come to respect the wisdom of many of the
common law evidentiary principles and have seen too many unintended
consequences when those principles have been disturbed. Certainly an
overabundance of concern for fairness, or a distorted sense of
trustworthiness and reliability, may have led to many cumbersome rules
that safely could be scaled back without serious consequence for
fairness. While reading his article, however, I often felt as though I was
reading Justice Powell's opinion in United States v. Inadi,l where cost
and efficiency were taken to an extreme.
Writing for the majority in Inadi, Justice Powell justified not
requiring the government to call available co-conspirators as witnesses
under the Confrontation Clause when co-conspirator admissions are used
against a criminal defendant because (1) it would be an onerous burden
for the government, and (2) it would serve little useful purpose for the
defendant because the co-conspirator/declarant "will be... wary of

* Professor of Law at the American University, Washington College of Law. Many of the
ideas discussed in this Article came from my most recent book, Evidence Principles & Practices:
150 Things You Were Never Taught, Forgot, or Never Understood(2006).
1. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
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coming to the aid of his former partners in crime.",2 In other words,
efficiency for the government was justified because the Court was
willing to presume the defendant guilty! While Professor Crump would
never consciously advocate such an outrageous position, neither, in all
probability, would Justice Powell. The heavy prosecution slant of his
article made an old criminal defense attorney feel a bit uncomfortable.3
Overcoming my initial discomfort, I studied Professor Crump's
ideas more closely and concluded that they could be the catalyst for a
national debate about the Rules of Evidence, the principles upon which
they were built, and the manner in which they have been applied. While
I may not believe that efficiency is as important a consideration as
Professor Crump urges, there is certainly much room for improvement.
For example, two changes surprisingly not mentioned by Professor
Crump in his drive to achieve more cost effectiveness were the
abandoned common law foundation requirement for the introduction of
evidence of prior inconsistent statements and bias.4 Rule 613 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence eliminated the foundation requirement for
prior inconsistent statements-directing only that the witness be given a
chance at some stage of the trial to confront and explain the alleged
inconsistency.5 In the metaphor of a foundation for a structure, the rule
now requires only a roof. Since there is little reason for not laying such a
foundation, and many advantages (for example, discovering other
inconsistent statements and further demonstrating the witness's lack of
credibility if they lie about the inconsistency under oath), reimposing the
requirement would make the trial more efficient because if the bias or
inconsistency were admitted during the foundation it would eliminate
the need for calling additional witnesses.

2. Id. at 395.
3. My discomfort with Professor Crump's article, fueled by the Inadi reasoning, stemmed
from my experience as a young man having the same name (including the same middle initial) as a
criminal in my hometown who had defrauded many individuals and businesses. I received many
irate telephone calls from abused women and was mistakenly confused in job interviews with the
other individual. Had I been charged with a crime involving co-conspirators of this other individual,
I would have benefited greatly from their appearance at trial, since being innocent I would not know
who they were, and once called, the co-conspirators could testify that I was not the Paul R. Rice
they knew without incriminating themselves.
4. While the majority of common law jurisdictions required a foundation to be laid before
inconsistent statements could be proven, many courts did not require a foundation before bias
evidence would be accepted. See Paul R. Rice, Back to the Future with Privileges: Abandon
Codification, Not the Common Law, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 739, 760 (2004) [hereinafter Rice, Back
to the Future].
5. FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
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Because there is no bias rule in the evidence code, other than
Rule 404(b),6 that permits the introduction of prior act evidence to show
motive, there has been unnecessary litigation about a foundation
requirement. Some courts have looked to Rule 613 for guidance and7
refused to impose a foundation requirement for bias evidence also.
Perversely, other courts have looked to Rule 613 to find justification for
imposing a foundation requirement! 8 We need a bias rule for the sake of
clarity and foundation requirements reimposed for the sake of efficiency.
Unlike the narrow focus of Professor Crump's article, however, I
believe that all options for improving the rules should be on the table,
not just ones that increase the cost effectiveness of trials. In the more
than thirty-five years of existence of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
there has been no code-wide reassessment of basic principles and
approaches. Periodically, the Advisory Committee surveys the code for
problems that need to be addressed, but because their mantra has been
"If it ain't broke, don't fix it" and it apparently "ain't broke if it ain't
stopping traffic," more issues have been ignored rather than addressed.
Therefore, any revision effort with a narrow focus, whether Professor
Crump's or someone else's, would be wasting a valuable opportunity to
substantially improve the evidence code. 9
In the brief space that I have to comment, I will discuss a few of the
topics mentioned by Professor Crump and identify a range of other
issues that also need attention.
II.

HEARSAY AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

Professor Crump identifies many of the problems with hearsay and
inconsistencies in our concerns about hearsay juxtaposed with the
unreliable exceptions that are recognized. Without question, many more
forms of hearsay might be admitted at trial without jeopardizing the
accuracy of its results. Indeed, many may even improve accuracy and
6. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
7. See, e.g., United States v. McCabe, No. 96-30092, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33704, at *1920 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1997). But see United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1985)
(imposing the requirement).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 955-56 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Lynch, 800 F.2d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 1986); Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 793 F.2d 1518, 1522-23
(11 th Cir. 1986); United States v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720, 720 (2d Cir. 1976).
9. Of course, the Advisory Committee is not a stranger to narrow revision efforts that are a
waste of resources. In the mid-1980s the Committee activated the revision process solely for the
purpose of making the evidence rules gender neutral. As important as that revision effort may have
been, it was not justified to the exclusion of all substantive problems that existed, and still exist,
within the code.
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fairness of the trial. The best example of this is the prior deposition
testimony upon which he focuses. 10 If the deposition was videotaped, it
is difficult to appreciate how the concerns of the hearsay rule are
furthered by requiring the witness to be unavailable at trial before the
videotape is admissible.
I also like the suggestion that the unavailability requirement for all
of the exceptions now codified in Rule 8041" be reexamined. While I
certainly understand a preference for live testimony, I see no reason to
exclude good hearsay simply because live testimony has been offered.
For too many of the old common law exceptions, the elements were
identified from the facts of the cases in which they originally were
recognized. Often the availability or unavailability of the declarant was
of no consequence to the judges' decisions, but it came to be identified
as an element. It would seem that the availability of the declarant adds to
the reliability of all hearsay because he can be cross-examined about his
prior statement. Strangely, however, a category of hearsay exceptions
12
requiring availabilityhas never been recognized.
A substantial amount of hearsay not falling within any of the
delineated exceptions have indicia of reliability either because of the
context in which they were made or the unique contexts in which they
are being used. By the same token, however, many forms of hearsay that
are currently admissible under established exceptions are of questionable
reliability and should be excluded. Are these existing rules
inappropriate? Are the fact patterns posed by Professor Crump reflecting
a broader problem for which a rule needs to be promulgated, or are they
only anecdotal and worthy of attention when they arise? The problem in
creating evidence rules with universal application is a difficult one of
definition and balance within a set of rules that fosters consistency and
predictability while achieving a desired level of reliability and fairness.
Every proposal has obvious advantages. Identifying and quantifying the
disadvantages is the challenge. That is what a national debate could do.
I will not attempt to identify and balance the advantages and
disadvantages of each of Professor Crump's proposals. Instead, I will
10. David Crump, The Casefor Selective Abolition of the Rules of Evidence, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 585,596-97 (2006).

11. See id. at 644.
12. The closest we have come to a category of hearsay exceptions requiring availability is
Rule 801(d)(I)(A)-(C), which makes prior inconsistent statements, prior consistent statements and
prior identifications admissible after the declarant has testified. However, these statements are not
classified as exceptions to the hearsay rule-they are excluded from the definition of hearsay. See
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(A)-(C); see also PAUL R. RICE & ROY A. KATRIEL, EVIDENCE: COMMON
LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 4.02, at 341-48 (5th ed. 2005).
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attempt to identify some of the unaddressed problems within the current
rules to demonstrate the depth of issues that need to be considered along
with Professor Crump's intriguing proposals.
Rule 801 apparently was a revisionist's playground in the early
1970s when the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated. There
were extensive revisions to the hearsay rule with too little concern for
either logic or consistency. And since their adoption, the Advisory
Committee has not been inclined to confront and resolve them because,
disrupt established expectations and
among other reasons given, it would
13
require a re-education of the bar.
First, for example, subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 80114
unnecessarily encumber the definition of hearsay with an
assertive/nonassertive distinction that ignores three of the four dangers
of hearsay simply because the implied assertion was not intended by the
declarant. While unintended assertions may not directly involve the
hearsay danger of insincerity, they indirectly involve sincerity problems
because if the direct message asserted and intended was insincere, the

indirect message taken from it is no more trustworthy than the direct
message.1 5 Aside from this indirect sincerity problem, such statements
still carry the dangers of faulty perception and memory as well as
ambiguity. Proponents argued that the other hearsay dangers could be
considered by the fact-finder on the question of weight, 16 but they never
explained how a rational assessment would be possible when the

declarant is unavailable and there is no way of quantifying each danger.
Apparently, they were comfortable leaving this assessment completely
to jury speculation.
13. See Rice, Back to the Future, supra note 4, at 750-51; see also Paul R. Rice, Advisory
Committee on the FederalRules of Evidence: Tending to the Past and Pretendingfor the Future?,
53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 821 (2002); Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of
Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 678
(2000) (discussing the "hands-off approach adopted by the Evidence Advisory Committee").
14. Subsection (a) defines the word "statement," which subsection (c) employs in the
definition of "hearsay." A "statement" is defined as an oral or written assertion, or conduct, if it was
intended as an assertion. FED. R. EvID. 801(a), (c).
15. For example, if a declarant uttered the statement, "Has anyone seen my umbrella?" that
could be construed as an indirect or unintended assertion that it is raining. If, however, the statement
was a prearranged coded message meaning, "Today is the day we will commit the robbery," the
misleading use of the words would give rise to an indirect message that is completely unreliable.
The same, of course, is true of insincere direct messages. For example, if an uncle satirically said,
"Isn't my nephew, John, a special kid!" when everyone knows that John is a pain in the posterior
because he is a drug addict and an ex-convict who has stolen from his parents and siblings, the
indirect, unintended message that could be read into the statement, "I am particularly fond of John"
would be completely unreliable.
16. See Rice & Delker, supra note 13, at 689.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:657

Second, the grammatical structure of the definition of a "statement"
in subsection (a) is ambiguous.' 7 It is not clear whether the last clause,
"if it is intended.., as an assertion," modifies only conduct as hearsay,
or oral and written assertions as well. As a consequence, the
assertive/nonassertive distinction recognized by the clause has been
applied illogically to words-oral and written-as well as conduct.' 8
Applying this distinction to words is illogical because the very use of a
word, written or oral, involves the intent to communicate the direct
message uttered.' 9 Having intended to communicate something to
someone, the danger of insincerity is injected back into the mix, even
though the indirect message that the statement is being used to establish
was not intended. 20 Two state courts have correctly concluded that an
indirect message can be no more reliable than the direct message from

17. Rule 801(a) provides:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct
of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
18. The clause was originally extended to words in United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464,
465-69 (E.D. Ky. 1980). That precedent has subsequently been followed without serious
questioning. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
19. See supra note 15.
20. See generally Paul R. Rice, Should Unintended Implications of Speech be Considered
Nonhearsay? The Assertive/Nonassertive Distinction Under Rule 801(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 529, 531 (1992) (arguing that the "assertive/nonassertive distinction" is
"misguided").
Other anomalies and inconsistencies exist within Rule 801, but are less significant to its
rational application. I will give three examples. First, the common law admissions exception has
been excluded from the hearsay rule under subsection 801(d)(2) on the premise that it differs from
all other hearsay exceptions in that it is based on the adversarial nature of the process-you speak at
your own risk-rather than the inherent reliability of the statement. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)
advisory committee's note. At the same time, however, other hearsay exceptions not premised on
reliability have been left in the rule. Specifically, this would include ancient documents in
Rule 803(18), and forfeiture by wrongdoing in Rule 804(b)(6). Second, prior consistent statements
have been made admissible for their truth under subsection (d)(l)(B) for no logical reason. Their
only value is the credibility that they provide for the witness who already has placed the evidence
into the record (if the jury believes the witness, the record has been made through his testimony, and
if the jury does not believe the witness, placing his prior consistent statement into the record twice
serves no purpose because the jury will not believe either statement). Third, Rule 801(d)(1)(A)-(C)
excludes certain statements from the hearsay rule (prior consistent and inconsistent statements, as
well as prior identifications) only if the declarant is present and testifying. In substance, this
subsection actually creates a third category of hearsay exception where the availability of the
declarant is material. Were it acknowledged as such, it would be an appropriate place to codify the
past recollection recorded exception, which requires the declarant to be present to authenticate the
writing but absent in that he had insufficient recollection to testify fully and accurately. Declarations
against interest might also be placed in such a category in order to minimize the problem of
fabricated declarations.
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which it is inferred. 2' It is time for Rule 801 to be revised to
acknowledge the same.
Because there are so many exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
problems, correspondingly, are too numerous to discuss. I will mention
only a few.
First, far too many exceptions have been created on little more than
assurances of sincerity. Excited utterances in Rule 803(2) and dying
declarations in Rule 804(b)(2) 22 are examples. Too often this has led to
statements being admitted into evidence with only the assurance that
they are sincerely erroneous, and the finder of facts is being given no
basis upon which to assess reliability. Therefore, contrary to the
proposals of Professor Crump, perhaps there are many hearsay
statements currently being admitted that should be excluded, rather than
the converse.
Second, findings of fact by government agencies have been made
admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) 23 even though the rules of evidence are
often neither understood nor followed by the hearing officers, and their
decisions are often influenced by special interest groups.24
Paradoxically, judgments from judicial proceedings, where due process
is afforded and the rules of evidence are followed, are only admissible
under Rule 803(22) from criminal felony cases. All civil judgments are
inadmissible to prove facts essential to those judgments.25 Similarly, the
opinions written and published by the judges in all of those cases have
no evidentiary value. This seems to be a terrible waste of relevant and
reliable evidence for no justifiable reason in light of Rule 803(8)(C).
Third, written present sense impressions recognized in Rule 803(1)
nullify the limitations in the past recollection recorded exception
codified in Rule 803(5).26 As long as the written statement was made
21. The illogic of this practice has been recognized only by the Iowa Supreme Court in State
v. Dullard,668 N.W.2d 585, 594-95 (Iowa 2003) and the Maryland Court of Appeals in Stoddardv.
State, 887 A.2d 564, 575 (Md. 2005). See PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES: 150
THINGS YOU WERE NEVER TAUGHT, FORGOT, OR NEVER UNDERSTOOD 72-74 (2006).
22. FED. R. EVID. 803(2), 804(b)(2).
23. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
24. The public records exception in Rule 803(8)(C) has many additional problems that I
discuss in a recent work. See RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 12, § 5.05, at 705-14. For example:
(1) Does the entire government record, and not just the factual findings, come in for truth under the
exception because the rule makes reports containing findings of fact admissible?, and (2) If the
report predominantly incorporates evidence that supports the agency's findings, can the party
against whom the findings are offered admit the remainder of the agency record for its truth under
the rule of completeness?
25. FED. R. EVID. 803(22) (exempting final judgments in criminal but not civil proceedings).
26. FED. R. EVID. 803(1),(5).
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contemporaneously with the event or condition being described, it is
admissible as a present sense impression without the declarant being
present at trial to authenticate it, vouch for its reliability, and establish
that he has insufficient recollection to testify fully and accurately-all of
the limitations in Rule 803(5). As a present sense impression, the writing
also comes in as an exhibit, while past recollections recorded may only
be read into the record. If the two exceptions are intended to serve
different purposes, those purposes need to be clarified.
In addition, because this exception borrowed language from the
common law excited utterance exception when it required that the
statement "describing or explaining" an event or condition be made
simultaneously with or "immediately" after the event perceived, courts
have inappropriately expanded the time-frame within which statements
will be considered "immediate.' 27 Unlike the excited utterances,
however, the present sense impression does not have to be in response to
an exciting event-it has no other indicia of reliability. Therefore, the
time-frame that may permissively elapse must be narrowly construed.
The rule needs to emphasize this construction.
Finally, because of the breadth of the residual exception in Rule
80728 (which permits judges to admit hearsay statements that are
inadmissible under the delineated exception in Rules 803 and 804 if
those statements are shown to possess equivalent circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness), judges have used it as an excuse for not
critically analyzing whether statements are hearsay in the first instance,
or fit within delineated exceptions if found to be hearsay. Courts will say
that a statement may or may not be hearsay, and if it is found to be
hearsay, it may or may not be admissible under this or that exception,
but the court need not resolve those issues because it has decided to
admit the statement under Rule 807.29 While this may be cost effective
27. But see People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328, 1334 (N.Y. 1996) (examining the phrase
"immediately thereafter" and concluding that it "was meant to suggest only that the description and
the event need not be precisely simultaneous," but that "[tihe language in question was certainly not
intended to suggest that declarations can qualify as present sense impressions even when they are
made after the event being described has concluded").
28. FED. R. EVID. 807.
29. Illustrating the erroneous conclusion that something is not hearsay is Dodart v. Young
Again Prods., Inc., No. 03-CV-00035, PC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72122, at *77 (D. Utah Sept. 29,
2006), where e-mail messages had been received from customers inquiring about products sold by
another finn. The e-mails were offered to prove customer confusion. Because the e-mails were
circumstantial evidence of the senders' state of mind, the court concluded that they were not
hearsay. Therefore, it did not need to decide whether they were admissible under the state of mind
or residual exception. Whether something is directly or indirectly stated is irrelevant to the hearsay
character of the statement. Just because the customers did not say "I'm confused" does not alter the
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for judges, it has serious consequences for our hearsay jurisprudence.
Because substantive issues go unresolved, hearsay jurisprudence is not
evolving today as it did under the common law. And with so many
disparate applications, the rule has lost its predictability, thereby
encouraging, rather than discouraging, litigation. Unlike the common
law where courts sparingly exercised their inherent power to admit new
forms of hearsay, evidence is now randomly being admitted without
structure and analysis under delineated elements of established titles.
As a matter of practical reality, when inherent power is delineated,
judges tend to be willing to use it more frequently. While Professor
Crump believes that the residual exception is not being used enough, I
would take the opposite position and advocate its abolition. If, however,
it is to be retained, its random use by trial judges must be reined in
through more restrictive language in the rule-not because it is creating
unfairness, or is inefficient, but because our jurisprudence is being
"dumbed down" to the easiest and most simple solutions for the sake of
efficiency.

hearsay dangers present when their inquires about products are offered to indirectly prove the same
thing-that they are confused.
Two cases illustrate the use of the residual exception when other delineated exceptions
were applicable. In United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
letters from corporate executives, responding to an inquiry by the government, were being offered
to establish the nonexistence of an industry standard. Rather than admitting these letters under the
state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, because the state of mind of the corporations' executives
was the state of mind of their corporations, and collectively they reflected the industry standard, the
court employed the residual exception. Id. In United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 314 (2d Cir.
1977), a bank teller was testifying about a license number that he had written down on a deposit slip
after a bank robbery. This license number had been relayed to the teller by a customer standing at
the front window, who was repeating the number being given to him by an occupant of a car who
had witnessed the getaway. Rather than seeing the writing on the deposit slip as three levels of
hearsay, and correctly analyzing each level under established exceptions, the court employed the
residual exception to conveniently solve the multiple level problem. Id. at 313-14.
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (D.D.C. 1981) involved a
use of the residual exception that Professor Crump might applaud. The government's divestiture
action was a collection of claims from eighty-two private causes of action. In their case the
government was extensively using documents provided by those independent plaintiffs. In their
defense, AT&T also wanted to use many of the internal documents maintained by those same
companies. To authenticate each document as a business record, AT&T would have consumed
months of trial time laying foundations for records that the government did not contest were
business records. To avoid this time-consuming foundation process, the judge accepted the records
under the residual exception and shifted the burden of persuasion to the government to show that
they were not what they appeared to be-reliable records maintained in the routine of business. Id.
at 1242-43. In extreme cases, extreme measures must be taken, but this problem could have been
dealt with in the same way under the business records exception.
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In the fact pattern posed by Professor Crump from Leake v.
Hagert,3 ° the son of one of the parties made statements against his
father's interests to the insurance investigator and then was out of the
country when the investigator attempted to repeat his utterance when
called as a witness. The testimony was held inadmissible on hearsay
grounds. 3' Professor Crump suggests that the facial reliability of the
statement and the circumstances of its use should have made it
admissible, particularly since the declarant was equally available to the
opposing party.3 2 Of course, facial reliability was the reason for adopting
the residual exception in Rule 807. 33 It is not clear, however, that such a
rule would be either fair or cost effective since it would give rise to timeconsuming litigation over the adequacy of notice to the opposing party
and the level of the opposing party's accessibility, both physically and
financially. There also is no inherent increase in the level of fairness,
efficiency or cost effectiveness by shifting to the opposing party the
costs of calling a witness.
A less extreme restriction of the hearsay rule would be to freely
admit out-of-court statements when the declarant is testifying from
present recollection about both the event and his own prior statement.
Such statements technically fall within the definition of hearsay but pose
none of its problems because the declarant is present, speaking under
oath, and subject to cross-examination about the substance of the
statement.34 This would be treating such statements much like the
statements that are currently being admitted as non-hearsay under Rule
801(d)(1)(A)-(C). 35 This modification, however, would change existing
law under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), which restricts the admissibility of prior
consistent statements to instances where the witness's credibility has
been attacked by charges of recent fabrication, improper influence or
motive. All such statements would be admissible for truth. This result,
however, may fare poorly under Professor Crump's cost effectiveness
analysis because consistent statements have little probative value over
reinforcing the credibility of the witness whose testimony has already
been heard.

30. 175 N.W.2d 675 (N.D. 1970).
31. Id. at 683.
32. See Crump, supranote 10, at 608-09.
33. See FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee's note.
34. Professor Edmund Morgan characterized this practice of excluding statements as hearsay
when the declarant is testifying as a "pious fraud." Edmund M. Morgan, HearsayDangers and the
Application of the HearsayConcept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 193 (1948).
35.

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
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On the flip side of this coin, Rule 801(d)(2)(D) makes statements of
a former employee admissible against the former employer as vicarious
admissions, even though the former employer has no access to the
former employee.36 Because the theory of the common law admissions
exception (now excluded from the definition of hearsay) is that we each
speak at our own risk, and must account for our own prior statements,
vicarious admissions of former employees stretch that theory to its
breaking point.37 The former employer may, in fact, have less access to
the former employee than the adversary offering the vicarious
admission. In modem industry, it is not uncommon for that former
employee to be working for the party now using his statement. That
often is how the party offering the statement was made aware of the
admission. Perhaps such statements should only be admissible as
vicarious admissions if the proponent calls the former employee as a
witness or demonstrates that the former employee is either unavailable
or is available to the party against whom it is offered.
III.

CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION

Professor Crump demeans the value of face-to-face confrontation of
witnesses. While his criticisms may have merit to the extent that
fabrication often cannot accurately be detected, it ignores the fact that
the value of confrontation may lie as much in the process--our
perception of its fairness, reaction to it, and acceptance of results from
proceedings in which it was available, rather than what it directly
produces by way of credibility assessments. This, of course, is why we
place such a high burden of persuasion on the government in criminal
cases. It would certainly be a lot more efficient if we could convict
people by a preponderance of the evidence, but we would not be as
comfortable depriving them of their freedom for the remainder of their
lives based on such adjudications. The right to confrontation and crossexamination seems to be of the same ilk.
IV.

REPETITIVE BEHAVIOR EVIDENCE

While Professor Crump makes a number of interesting points about
the law's inconsistencies in admitting repetitive behavior evidence, at
least one of his arguments appears to be erroneous, and the breadth of
36. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
37. This is why the original Advisory Committee refused to recognize the common law
privity admissions-statements made by a former owner of property while he still held title. See
Paul Rothstein, Teaching Evidence, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 999, 1027 (2006).
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his proposals are incomplete. His discussion of prior act evidence under
Rule 404(b) and comparison to admissibility of prior similar acts of
sexual misconduct under Rules 413 through 41538 is questionable. He
says that the 404(b) evidence of prior robberies will not be admitted in
the robbery prosecution, while the sexual abuse evidence under Rules
413 through 415 will be admitted in the sexual assault prosecution. 39 I
believe this is incorrect. While the prior robberies may not be admitted,
there is no assurance that the prior sexual offenses will be. His
conclusion assumes that an admissibility decision under Rules 413
through 415 will not be subject to the same Rule 403 unfairness balance
that will be involved in the Rule 404(b) decision. While the language in
these Rules may suggest otherwise, 40 judicial decisions have uniformly
concluded that admissibility may involve a balancing act. 4 ' As a
consequence, results in both Rules 404(b) and 413 through 15
appropriately have been much the same.
His proposals are inadequate in that they advocate only the
expansion of use against criminal defendants. Perhaps this again reflects
his prosecutorial leanings, but the lack of relevance of prior act evidence
reflected in prior felony convictions is as much in need of change as any
of the examples Professor Crump has given us.
Rule 60942 perpetuates the common law division between felony
and misdemeanor convictions when they are used for impeachment
purposes. It admits all felony and misdemeanor convictions involving
dishonesty or false statement. Felony convictions as a class do not have
the same relevance that they did under the common law when this
distinction was first recognized. After penal laws were codified, the
definition of criminal conduct became a political football. Everything
criminalized tended to be made a felony in order to demonstrate the
politicians' deep concern about the problem and commitment to law and
order.43 By contrast, under the common law, only the most egregious
38.

FED. R. EVID. 413-15.

39. Crump, supra note 10, at 629-31.
40. For example, Rule 413 says "[E]vidence of the defendant's commission of another
offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible .. " FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (emphasis added).
Rule 414 says: "[E]vidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child
molestation is admissible .... FED. R. EvID. 414(a) (emphasis added); see also FED. R. EVID.
415(a) (using similar language).
41. See United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d
Cir. 1997).
42.

FED. R. EVID. 609.

43. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1995, at 72, 77 (discussing the similar idea that "criminal law is increasingly used against purely
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offenses-generally those that were malum in se (reflecting evil in
themselves)-were classified as felonies." As a consequence, the
felony/misdemeanor distinction no longer has the same meaning. The
admissibility of convictions should now turn on the nature of the
conduct involved in the conviction (which it indirectly, albeit
inadequately, did under the common law) rather than the penalties that
were possible.
45
This proposal would effectively merge Rules 608(b) and 609.
While all prior acts reflecting on credibility could still be inquired about
under Rule 608(b), the cross-examiner could not prove those acts
through extrinsic evidence unless they were the subject of a conviction
(the status of which-felony or misdemeanor-would be irrelevant).
While on the subject of Rule 608(b), its restrictive practice of
requiring the cross-examiner to "take the answer" relative to denied prior
acts reflecting on credibility might also be re-examined under Professor
Crump's push for relevancy, consistency, cost-effectiveness, and
fairness. This practice was an off-shoot of the old collateral evidence
46
rule that has been abandoned. This should have been abandoned too. It
was premised on a perceived need for efficiency-keeping the trial
focused by not being sidetracked with additional disputes. This is an
instance, however, where concern for efficiency and simplicity has
produced an irrational practice that needs to be seen for what it is.
It does not make sense to allow the cross-examiner to inquire about
a prior act that shows lack of credibility and then preclude the crossexaminer from proving the act once it is denied. Allowing inquiry and
denial without proof simply accommodates sophisticated liars. While
proof definitely involves a sidetrack, it seems to be far too critical to the
trial's fairness and accuracy to be excluded. Proof of the denied act is
not only relevant to credibility because of the commission of the act, but,

regulatory offenses.., to enlist the moral force implicit in criminal conviction for the sake of

deterrence").
44. See Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: FederalRule of Evidence
609(A)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1087, 1089-90 (2000)
("Other [common law] classifications, such as malum in se... also rely less on a concept of
harmfulness than on the idea of moral wrongfulness (the degree to which an act violates a moral
norm) or culpability (whether an .actorintended her act or was mistaken or insane).").
45.

FED. R. EvID. 608(b).

46. See Michael J. Hutter, Evidence, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 601, 623 (1995) ("The collateral
evidence rule permits the introduction of extensive evidence to refute a witness' testimony, as well
as cross-examination of the witness concerning prior statements that are inconsistent with the
witness' testimony, only when the extrinsic evidence or prior statement involves a non-collateral
matter.").
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more importantly, because proof of it demonstrates that the witness has
just lied under oath to the jury being asked to believe him.
When the credibility of a central witness is critical to the outcome
of the trial, this type of evidence seems indispensable. Of course, there
will be instances where both the inquiries and the proof will have
marginal importance either because the witness's testimony is
unimportant-making his credibility less significant-or the nature of
the act has little probative value. In such instances, of course, a judge
would have the power to avoid the distractions, confusion and delays of
either the inquiry or the proof through a Rule 403 balance.
V.

EXPERT WITNESS OPINIONS

Professor Crump touches on Article V11 47 without exploring many
of its critical problems. To be sure, the Court's definition of "science" in
its Daubert48 decision was narrow, at best, and naive and wrong-headed,
at worst. In Daubert,the Court again demonstrates that when judges step
outside their discipline, and attempt to act like scientists, they tend to
step on and into things that they do not understand.49 Professor Crump
has written a great deal on this subject and his opinions are important.
He notes that through this decision and its progeny the Court has
established a "long list of requirements for expert opinion evidence" that
have proven to be hopelessly confusing, overwhelmingly difficult to
apply, time consuming beyond belief, and costly beyond reason. 50 The
purported "liberal" admissibility standard established in Daubertwith its
nonexhaustive criteria have proven to be just the opposite. Professor
Crump insists that the standard must be simplified. To that I say amen.
We should be far less intimidated by expert testimony than the standard
we use for screening suggests that we are. It is only a relevance decision
that is being made when screening expert opinion evidence: Jurors are
more competent than the Court is willing to give them credit for and are
47. FED. R. EVID. art. VII.
48. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
49. The same problem was demonstrated when the justices attempted to act like historians in
the Crawford decision, where they discovered a new definition of the right of confrontation through
their historical examination of the Star Chamber proceedings that gave rise to the creation of the
right. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50 (2004). Concluding that the right only applies to
testimonial type hearsay, the Court pinned its analysis on historical facts that were incomplete and
inconsistent with its own analysis. Id. at 51-53. Contrary evidence was dismissively explained as
being sui generis even though it was not in a class by itself. Id. at 56. For a more complete
exploration of this opinion and its deficiencies, see RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 12, § 5.03, at 47377 (5th ed. 2005).
50. Crump, supra note 10, at 600.
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more than willing to reject the urging of charlatans; the adversarial
system, with opposing experts, effectively exposes weaknesses; and the
trial judge has the power to ensure fairness through directed verdicts and
granting judgments notwithstanding verdicts. After the Daubert
decision, rather than giving directions to trial judges by clarifying Rule
702, the Advisory Committee did little more than codify revisions that
5
parrot the Daubert language of reliability. ' Surely they are capable of
more.
Article VII, however, has many equally compelling problems. For
example, Rule 70352 permits experts to rely on otherwise inadmissible
evidence.53 At the same time, however, the rule precludes the delineation
of that otherwise inadmissible evidence unless the proponent can
demonstrate that its probative value substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. This relatively recent revision to Rule 703 creates a
number of problems the Advisory Committee process has shown no
inclination to address:
First, how are the jurors supposed to be the sole finders of facts,
with the expert only assisting them, if the jury is not permitted to hear
the basis of the expert's opinions?
Second, if the probative value of the otherwise inadmissible
underlying evidence does not substantially outweigh their prejudicial
effect (thereby precluding their delineation for the jury), why should
opinions premised on those facts be admissible?
Third, if the otherwise inadmissible underlying evidence is
delineated for the jury, can the jurors rely on that evidence for its truth if
the expert has accepted it for its truth-creating 54what could be described
hearsay rule?
as an open-ended exception to the

Fourth, if creating an open-ended exception to the hearsay rule is
intended, should not safeguards be established to ensure that the
reliability of the evidence has been properly evaluated by the expert?
Should not the expert be required to have personally examined and
assessed the reliability of what she has accepted as true, rather than

51. EVIDENCE PROJECT, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
COMMENTS AND PROPOSALS 3 (1998).
52. FED. R. EVID. 703.

53. Id.
54. This was proposed by the Evidence Project at the American University Washington
College of Law over a decade ago. See Evidence Project,Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 330, 641-43 (1997). The proposal was summarily rejected by the Advisory
Committee.
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accepting it as a generic class of evidence that is generally relied upon
55
by experts in the particular field?
Last, if the jurors are instructed that the otherwise inadmissible
evidence they are being permitted to hear cannot be accepted for its truth
(because the open-ended hearsay exception discussed above is not
acceptable), how is that instruction logical if the jurors are permitted to
accept the opinion of the expert premised on its truth?
As noted above, Rule 703 only addresses whether the otherwise
inadmissible evidence can be delineated. If the basis is only admissible
to explain how the expert arrived at his conclusions, this would be
inconsistent with what the Evidence Code has done in Rule 803(4) with
statements of medical history and causation made to medical expert
witnesses.5 6 Under the common law, the doctor could only repeat what
the patient had said about history and causation, and the jury was
instructed that the patient's statements were coming in only to explain
the doctor's diagnosis. 57 This created an emperor-wearing-no-clothes
problem that was ignored for decades-everyone knew that it could not
realistically be done, but everyone became comfortable with acting like
it could and ignoring the illogic. Eventually the irrational practice was
eliminated by Rule 803(4), which made both history and causation
admissible for truth. Is Rule 703 reviving this absurd practice for all
expert witness, while the code has eliminated it for medical expert
witnesses? Why? Since the expert is testifying, like the medical doctor,
and can be examined about why she chose to credit that evidence, there
55. The rule proposed by the Evidence Project was:
Revised Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial

(5) Statements employed in expert testimony. Statements employed by experts in
developing testimony for trial, to the extent that such statements are (1) personally
observed by the expert, or (2) if not personally observed by the expert, of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, and, in both instances, the expert has demonstrated to the
presiding judge a basis for concluding that the particular statements possess substantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.
Id. at 641.
56. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
57. See John J. Capowski, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Statements to Mental Health
Professionals Under the Diagnosis or Treatment Hearsay Exception, 33 GA. L. REv. 353, 362
(1999) (explaining that "[t]he [common law] practice was that '[wihile these statements were not
admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis of his opinion,"' and
that "[Rule 803(4)] abolished the distinction between simply allowing the jury to hear the
statements that were used as the basis for the expert's opinion and admitting the statements as
substantive evidence") (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note).
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is no logic in solving the problem for one and creating it for the other.
With explanations of assessed reliability by the testifying experts, jurors
should be able to evaluate both the expert and her evidence and
intelligently use the evidence in the same way as the expert.
VI.

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE SCREENING

While scientific evidence must now be screened under the test
enunciated in the Supreme Court's Daubert decision, what neither the
Court in Daubert nor the Advisory Committee in the Federal Rules of
Evidence has addressed is how reliable the science-and technology
after the Kumho Tire58 decision-must be before it can be used in the
courtroom. While the old Frye5 9 test required that novel scientific
principles have gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community, 60 a fair assessment of the Daubert test suggests that it is
little more than Frye in drag-dressed up to be made to appear to be
something that it is not. Since judges are not scientists, their assessment
of error rate, testing and its adequacy, and peer review requires judges to
go back to the same relevant scientific community relied upon in Frye to
evaluate and apply the factors enunciated in Daubert. This is why the
decisions under the Daubert test are virtually the same as they were
under the Frye test. 61 Therefore, as in Frye, acceptability of science, the
methodologies through which the science was used, and its application
must meet a scientific field's standards of reliability. Since many of the
hard sciences require an accuracy rate of over ninety-six percent,
because they are looking for scientific truths, why are we restricting the
use of science and technology in the courtroom to that level of accuracy?
Since we are only resolving a social dispute by a preponderance of the
evidence-a standard by which science never operates-should not a
lesser standard of accuracy and reliability be acceptable? When the
scientific results are considered with other evidence presented at a trial,
why should scientific principles and methodologies that are only eighty
percent accurate, for example, not be considered sufficiently helpful to
be acceptable? 62 This, of course, would create the awkward situation
58. Kurnho Tire Co., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
59. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
60. See id. at lOl4.
61. Martin L. C. Feldman, May I Have the Next Dance, Mrs. Frye?, 69 TUL. L. REV. 793, 803
(1995).
62. While the mere fact of asking this question may demonstrate my woeful lack of
understanding of science and its relevance in the resolution of social disputes, I am afraid that my
mediocrity may be more the norm than the exception among the judiciary charged with this
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where scientists would be asked to testify that scientifically speaking the
63
principle in question is garbage, but "it's good enough for you guys!"
The totality of the evidence code needs to be re-examined with the
same mind-set that gave rise to the revolutionary changes in the best
evidence or original writing rule in Article X of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 64 When the content of a material writing was being proven
under the common law, the proponent had to produce the original of that
writing or show how it was unavailable due to no serious fault of the
proponent of secondary evidence. Best evidence objections were raised
as a matter of course, even though there were no serious concerns about
the accuracy of the content of the writing being proven. With the
creation of the "duplicate" rule 65-basically
encompassing all
mechanically produced copies-which made those copies admissible as
if they were originals unless a serious question about authenticity was
raised by the opponent, best evidence objections virtually disappeared.
This was true cost effective rule-making.
VII.

LOGICAL RELEVANCE

With the many compelling problems identified by Professor
Crump, his criticisms of the definition of logical relevance in Rule 401,66
and the exclusion of relevant evidence that is permitted under Rule 403,
is a bit too pedantic. Logical relevance is similar to the concept of
obscenity-we know it when we see it, except that logical relevance
may be easier to identify because it is measured against the issues being
litigated. Professor Crump's concern about marginally relevant evidence
with minimal prejudicial effect seems easily addressed by the language
screening responsibility. I will happily, however, bear the badge of mediocrity if one of the more
astute among us will provide an explanation of what seems to have been so obvious to so many for
so long that it has never warranted even a comment.
63. The high standard that has been set for admissibility of scientific evidence seems to have
placed a heavy hand on the scales of justice in favor of our industrial base relative to questions of
causation in toxic tort cases. While I do not oppose such a protective measure as a social policy
decision, this needs to be acknowledged for what it is and openly debated. Perhaps the protective
standard is too high. Until we acknowledge what we are doing, we can never rationally control it.
64.

FED. R. EviD. 1001(3), 1004.

65. Rule 1001(4) defines a duplicate as "a counterpart produced by the same impression as
the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and
miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent technique which accurately reproduces the original." FED. R. EVID. 1001(4). Rule 1003
provides: "[A] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1)a genuine question
is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit
the duplicate in lieu of the original." FED. R. EVID. 1003.
66. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
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of Rule 403 that authorizes the presiding judge to exclude relevant
evidence if there is a substantial possibility that it will confuse or
mislead the jury, create undue delay, or waste time.67 While Professor
Crump would counter that the requirement that these dangers
"substantially outweigh" probative value diminishes the likelihood of
exclusion, I would simply point out that a Rule 403 balance is a
discretionary judgment call, and because the evidence in his hypothetical
has only minimal probative value, a corresponding small amount of
delay, distraction, or confusion can be seen as "substantially"
outweighing that value. There are too many bigger fish to be fried. This
one should be thrown back.
Closely related to the issue of logical relevance is the requirement
of authentication. The proponent of evidence has to establish that the
evidence is what he claims.68 Professor Crump wants to relax this
requirement so that items usually taken as authentic in our daily lives are
accepted as authentic in judicial proceedings. He seems to be arguing for
a broader concept of self-authentication.6 9 I am sympathetic to this
argument. Perhaps this could be accomplished by assuming authenticity
if notice is given to the opposing side of each document that will be
presented at trial, and the propositions that each will be offered to
establish. If the opponent does not come forward before trial with
serious objections to authenticity, or reasons why it would be unfair to
forgo the foundation requirement-for example, he had no reasonable
means of verifying genuineness-they are accepted as authentic. In
substance, this would be doing for authentication what the duplicate rule
did for the best evidence requirement-virtually eliminate most of the
costly and time-consuming evidence that currently has to be produced.
VIII.

PRIVILEGES

With his cost-benefit thesis, I was surprised that Professor Crump
omitted any reference to privileges. Perhaps that is because his
experiences have principally been as a prosecutor in criminal cases, and
the privileges that confronted him were either the attorney-client
privilege, which is thought to be sacred in the administration of justice in
an adversarial system, or constitutional in origin and therefore outside
the scope of his evidence rules proposals. In civil actions, however,
particularly in the context of electronic evidence, the cost of privilege67. FED. R. EVID. 403.
68. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
69. See Crump, supra note 10, at 639-40.
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especially the attorney-client privilege-and its waiver have become
astronomical.7 ° Concern for this, as well as problems of waiver,
prompted corporations to use their influence through the ABA and
Congress to pressure the Advisory Committee to propose rules to protect
corporations from waiving privileges when they inadvertently disclose
documents in a large discovery undertaking or selectively give them to
government agencies in the spirit of cooperation during governmental
investigations. 71 I find these proposals particularly inappropriate because
the Federal Rules of Evidence have not even recognized the privileges
that the new rules are trying to protect. Clearly, this is another example
of powerful special interests having their voice heard over all other
voices in a codified rules process without all views and positions being
seriously considered.
Most troubling about the proposal, however, is the fact that the
propriety of even extending the attorney-client privilege to fictitious
corporate entities is not even being discussed, much less seriously
debated. The reason this is so troubling is the fact that in the corporate
context, the fictitious legal entity is given the privilege, and those who
speak for the entity are given no direct protection by it. As a
consequence, the privilege cannot achieve its goal of open
communications because it protects only the entity that cannot speak,
and denies the protection to those who do.
Employees receive a protection from the corporation's privilege
only indirectly-when the corporation elects to assert it, and that does
not happen unless it is in the corporation's interests. The employees'
interests are secondary at best. While corporations will argue that
employees speak openly only because of the existence of the privilege,
that is highly questionable. If they do not believe they are culpable, they
will speak openly whenever corporate counsel inquires. When they are
culpable, they speak openly only because they mistakenly believe that
they are personally protected by the corporation's privilege. Whatever

70.

See PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC

EVIDENCE: LAW AND

PRACTICE

131-88 (2005)

(discussing the complicated nature of the attorney-client privilege, and the ways in which
technology is affecting this area of the law).
71. Actually, these corporate disclosures during governmental investigations are less in the
spirit of cooperation and more a product of calculated advantage. They make the disclosures
because it is determined to be in their best interests. This is a decision that individuals under the
broad net of governmental investigations and prosecutions have had to make forever, not only with
regard to privileges, but also with regard to turning state's evidence. Why should such calculated
corporate decisions be permitted, thereby destroying the confidentiality upon which their privilege
protection is premised, and achieving their calculated gain, without paying the cost of waiving the
privilege protections that they have destroyed?
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openness corporations currently experience in their counsels'
communications with their employees, that same level of openness likely
can be achieved through a corporate "talk or walk" ultimatum. No
privilege is justified if its goals can be achieved without suppressing
relevant evidence.
If the corporate privilege were abolished, hundreds of millions of
dollars would be saved annually in litigation cost, not to mention the
costs in maintaining the confidentiality of each communication in order
to avoid waiver. Recently, these costs have been compounded with the
creation of metadata-the data underlying each document-that is
retrievable when documents are produced electronically without first
being scrubbed.7 2 Of course the elimination of the privilege would also
eliminate the overwhelming majority of privilege claims that judicial
officers must review in camera and rule upon. The savings here are
incalculable.
Having broached the subject of privilege, I cannot resist
commenting on the waiver provisions the Advisory Committee has
circulated for public comment. These rules would codify the prevailing
views taken by most courts on the subject of inadvertent disclosuresthe "oops" rule or claw-back provision-not effecting a waiver, and
limited waiver-making disclosures to government agencies without
effecting a broader waiver for the remainder of the world. These
proposed rules are inappropriate. They are injecting the Advisory
Committee codification process into the middle of a vital, evolving area
of the law that heretofore has been left to development under common
law principles. By doing this, the proposed rules would likely retard the
evolution of the privilege that has been so vital under the common law
over the past century.73 It also would create the following problems:
First, after disclosures have been made to investigating
governmental agencies, and those disclosures are used in enforcement
proceedings against either the client or third parties, what happens to the
privilege preserved by the proposed provision? Will the government not
be permitted to use them? If not, what is the point of encouraging
cooperation?

72. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 782 (2004) (defining
metadata as "data hidden in documents that is generated during the course of creating and editing
such documents... includ[ing] fragments of data from files that were previously deleted,
overwritten or worked on simultaneously").
73. See generally Rice, Back to the Future, supra note 4 (advocating a rejection of the
codification of privilege rules).
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Second, if the disclosed communications are usable, after the
confidentiality that historically formed the basis for the privilege has
been destroyed, not only through the initial disclosure but also through
them being broadcast to the world in subsequent proceedings, how can
the privilege continue to survive if the concept of confidentiality has any
meaning?
Third, if the privilege does not survive, why should the Advisory
Committee create this labyrinth for only a temporary preservation of the
privilege?
Another important question that the proposed waiver rules raise is
why the law should encourage cooperation only with government
agencies. While cooperation with governmental agencies is certainly in
the public interest, that interest is often no more compelling than
cooperation among adversaries in private litigation that dominates
judicial dockets. In addition, the matters in controversy in many private
cases, particularly those that are joined for pretrial discovery purposes
under the Multi-District Litigation Statute,7 4 may have far more at stake
and greater implications for segments of society than matters
investigated by the government. But even if a convincing argument
could be made for cooperating in governmental investigations to the
exclusion of private litigation, an existing remedy is available to
corporations through a well-established body of law relating to
protective orders that the proposed rules would also codify.75 Such
protective orders are preferable to a broad limited waiver provision
because they are supervised and controlled by judicial officers.76
Professor Crump says that he wants to get rid of rules of evidence
"that exclude significant amounts of useful evidence" and that do not
serve a positive purpose "that perceptibly exceed their effect in making
trials more expensive. 7 7 He must have been thinking about the
corporate attorney-client privilege, and I think he makes an excellent
point.

74.

28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). See generally Wilson W. Herndon & Ernest R. Higginbotham,

Complex Multidistrict Litigation-An Overview of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 33

(1979) (examining the details of multi-district litigation).
75.

See PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 11:20, at 149-

51 (2d ed. 1999).
76. For a broader discussion of protective orders, see id. §§ 11:20-:24, at 149-61.
77. Crump, supra note 10, at 588.
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IX.

ANOTHER RADICAL PROPOSAL

While radical proposals are being put forward, I offer another.
Rather than abolishing selected rules of evidence, why not abolish the
entire Federal Rules of Evidence as a binding code of procedure? Since
the quasi-legislative process of rule making through an advisory
committee process has proven to be cumbersome, politicized, and
unresponsive, I propose that the Advisory Committee's rules be only
what its name suggest-advisory. For centuries, the common law
evidence rules have faired as well as the Evidence Code has over the
past thirty-five years, if for no other reason than the fact that the
common law rules evolved from judicial responses to the equities of
individual cases, rather than the biases of advisory committee members
and desires of special interest groups. If the rules of evidence were not
binding on trial judges, the Advisory Committee would likely be far
more willing to propose new and novel approaches because there would
be no immediate consequences. Through this guidance, judges could be
kept abreast of new ideas and approaches to common problems, and
when needs and opportunities arise, they could try them on a limited
basis. Through the successes and failures of their use, other judges could
assess the likely costs and benefits when used in other contexts. Through
this effort, rules and their use would probably develop at a faster rate
than they are currently evolving in a codified system that is driven by the
common law of judges operating outside the bounds of the rules because
they are not being adequately maintained.
X.

CONCLUSION

The underlying thesis of Professor Crump's article is a need for
more trials. I do not share that view. Trials are not necessarily good
things and more trials certainly are not necessarily better. Altering the
rules of evidence to accomplish this end is a bit like using the tax code to
encourage housing development. It might achieve its goal, but it can be
short-sighted and have significant, unanticipated, and unfair
consequences for the system. Cases that do not result in trials do not
necessarily result in a less fair resolution of disputes. Indeed, settlement
negotiations are a process in which there is complete party participation
and control. For many, this produces a far quicker, less costly, more
understandable, and therefore more acceptable resolution.
The proposals of Professor Crump, however, are a good jumpingoff point for a national debate about a vast array of issues that need to be
addressed in both the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of
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Civil Procedure. His concern for efficiency and cost effectiveness
certainly has its place in those considerations, but I could not support it
as a primary goal. Making democratic institutions operate is seldom
easy, and achieving fairness in those institutions is not always efficient.
Our rules have developed through centuries of experience. The wisdom
reflected in those rules should not be lightly abandoned, particularly
with a single, albeit important, goal in mind.
Supporting the common law tradition, I believe that the equities of
individual cases should be the driving force behind evidence rules and
their changes. Rules promulgated outside those bounds are too easily
and too often influenced by vested interests that are adept at dressing up
greed and self-interest as equity and fairness. As I have come to trust the
wisdom of our predecessors, I also have come to trust more the wisdom
of individual judges on a case-by-case basis where something concrete,
grounded in equity, is at stake, than the product of committee
deliberations, even committees of judges. Both ponder theoretical
applications and implications of concrete rules and proposals, but
committees do so focused on nothing in particular because nothing of
consequence in the immediate is at stake and the lives and interests of
real people do not hang in the balance.
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